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Small States, Great Power?  
Gaining Influence through Intrinsic, Derivative, and Collective Power
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It is a good moment in history to be a small state. Small states’ survival and territorial 
integrity are protected by norms, institutions, and the stated policy of the world’s strongest 
power; this situation seems little changed for most small states despite increasing great power 
competition in Eastern Europe and East Asia. Legal norms of sovereign equality give small 
states a voice in many international organizations. An open global trading order has allowed 
many small states to specialize and prosper. Today, the threats to small states are fewer, and the 
number of small states has increased. Conditions of “democratization, trade liberalization, and 
reduction of warfare are associated with the formation of small countries” because these 
conditions promote small states’ wellbeing (Alesina and Spolaore 2003:165-67). Another author 
credited “de-colonisation, de-polarisation, democratisation, deregulation and digitalisation” for 
the emergence of new polities (Henrikson 2001:65-71). Might the same conditions bolster small 
states’ influence? 
 If one were to sum up the conventional wisdom on small states, it might be said that 
while small states are not powerless, when they are confronted directly by a great power, the 
logic of Thucydides still holds. This article contests that interpretation, to a point, particularly as 
applied to contemporary international relations. That logic is underpinned by a militarily 
oriented, resource-based conception of “compulsory power,” to use Barnett and Duvall’s term 
(2005:49-51). That approach to power is deeply embedded in the study of small states, and 
indeed, in the many and contested definitions of “small state.” However, as IR scholars have 
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long recognized, brute quantifications of resources are an inadequate metric for many issues in 
world politics. Even in the military field, great powers may topple governments if they are 
willing to make a major effort, but then find definitive victory elusive. Possessing resources still 
matters, but it is less determinate than the great power/small state dichotomy leads one to 
believe. As a classic book noted, small states are as powerful as their “capacity to achieve 
intended results,” and at times, “other factors outweighed their material weakness” (Rothstein 
1968:3, 20).  
Several years ago, the introduction to a volume on small states noted that, “small states 
are often treated as objects, not as subjects of international relations” (Neumann and Gstöhl 
2006:19). In fact, work on small states has alternated between emphasizing constraints and 
limitations on the one hand and independence, resilience, and even power on the other. In post-
Cold War IR scholarship, the focus on small states’ possibilities has grown more prevalent. This 
emphasis does not only reflect more auspicious international conditions; divergent perceptions of 
small states implicitly reflect different conceptualizations of what it means to exercise power in 
international relations. First, though, a clarification is needed about the term “small state.” The 
literature lacks a common definition or set of criteria to define who counts as “small” (Henrikson 
2001:56-65; Maass 2009:65-68). Even among states that intuitively fit the category, the 
differences can be stark. How can states as diverse as Honduras, Lesotho, Singapore, and 
Switzerland fit into the same theoretically relevant category? Without clear cut-off points, 
studies on small states have included Turkey and Spain on the one hand (see Fox 1959) or been 
limited to island microstates on the other (Mohammed 2013). State “size” clearly exists along a 
continuum, which does little to distinguish who is “small” and who is not. Building on an 
approach from Steinmetz and Wivel (2010), Rostoks (2010), and Long (2016), this article places 
states in the context of asymmetrical relationships. “Relational power or, to be more precise, 
relational weakness is the main characteristic of small states” (Rostoks 2010:87). This differs 
from definitions that seek an upper limit on smallness or create fixed categories via qualitative 
measures (Maass 2009:74-80; Rickli 2008:309). While useful categories of state size have 
proved elusive, creating categories of behaviors can help scholars understand the dynamics of 
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asymmetrical relationships from the perspective of the weaker state.
2
 This article proposes three 
forms of power that are available and particularly relevant to small states: particular-intrinsic, 
derivative, and collective power. All states, small or large, can either try to exploit their internal 
resources or turn to other states. However, because small states, by definition, lack more 
traditional forms of power, they must specialize in how they employ their resources and 
relationships. Small states depend more heavily on external options, whether a special 
relationship with a great power or other small states. This taxonomy explains the three forms of 
power according to their base, scope, means, and amount (Dahl 1957), which connects small 
states to broader debates around power in IR. 
The first section of the article examines the changing concepts of power employed in the 
study of small states. To some extent, these reflect broader debates about power in IR, though 
resources and compulsory power dominated until recently. The article then develops the 
taxonomy mentioned above by specifying the base, scope, means, and amount of the different 
types of power, and explaining these in relation to diverse concepts of power. In conclusion, the 
article addresses how these categories are particularly relevant to small states. Many small states 
are thriving in a world that is more open and democratic, where the threat of force has receded 
somewhat and has proven less effective. Non-traditional facets of power are central for states 
that lack coercive instruments, but they are increasingly relevant for all states. 
Concepts of Power in Studies of Small States 
Power remains both a central and contested term in International Relations. Guzzini (2005:495) 
argues that “the meaning of power is always embedded in a theoretical context.” That is no less 
true in the case of power and the small state. As Berenskoetter (2007) notes, the concept of 
power in IR has been dominated by realism – at the very least, the debate has occurred on 
realists’ terms. Defined by their very weakness, small states struggled to gain respect in IR, a 
field long focused on the international competition for power. Goetschel (1998:13) colorfully 
writes: “Small states were seen as fragile creatures in the rough sea of international relations. 
They were internally well suited for democratic regimes but externally helpless and constantly 
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threatened by extinction.” That view, never unanimous, has waned further in the last two 
decades, even as the number of small states has grown. Instead of assuming dependence and 
weakness, even vis-à-vis a great power, currents in the literature on small states increasingly 
explore opportunities for autonomy and influence. More pluralistic approaches to power offer 
greater possibilities for positively evaluating small states. 
The “small states” literature is diverse, and in a sense united through the use of that term 
(though small power, weak state, weak power, etc., have been used interchangeably). The 
literature incorporates several currents that do not always interact: developed versus 
underdeveloped, European versus non-, economics versus security. A thorough review of each of 
these literatures is beyond the scope of this piece, and has been admirably tackled by others 
(Baldacchino 2009; Maass 2009; Neumann and Gstöhl 2006). Instead, this section explores the 
literature in light of the concepts of power that undergird perceptions of small states’ 
vulnerability or resilience, impotence or importance. Foregrounding these diverse concepts of 
power illustrates why attempts to define “small state” have often fallen into the inverse of Dahl’s 
“lump of power fallacy.” Small states have been defined as a “lump of weakness,” which does 
not recognize their ability to exercise power, even if limited to specific issues, geographies, or 
relationships. “The traditional definition is simply unable to explain the influence Small Powers 
have come to exert in world politics,” Rothstein (1968:21) argued five decades ago. The realities 
of both small states and power are more complex. As Rostoks (2010:88) notes, “Luckily enough, 
from the viewpoint of small states, exercise of power is more complicated than the mere ability 
of the strong to get what they want.” The following section highlights how influential 
conceptions of power relate to work on small states. 
Power as material resources 
The notion that power and influence in world politics are fundamentally based on the 
possession of certain material resources has deep roots and still exercises great sway. Resource-
based definitions of power facilitate quantification and prediction.  For some theorists, primarily 
realists, the possession of resources is power. Morgenthau and Mearsheimer both employ this 
approach to power, though neither ignores that the ultimate purpose of power is to change the 
behavior of other actors (Mearsheimer 2001:57-76; Morgenthau and Thompson 1985:145-63). 
Material resources are often associated with what Barnett and Duvall (2005:49) call “compulsory 
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power,” though they are far from the same. It is often assumed that possession of resources is 
related to the ability to change others’ behavior. This assumption undergirds the focus on 
resources as an indicator of power or as power itself, despite the well-known difficulties of 
translating resources to capabilities and capabilities to “power over” another actor. Great powers 
struggle in wars against small ones, as well as against non-state actors (Mack 1975; Maoz 1989; 
Sullivan, 2007). Power resources are rarely fungible (Baldwin 1979:174). 
The very definition of “small state” has typically been based on the amount of resources 
the small state possesses – that is, not very many. If population, GDP, territory, and military 
resources make a power “great,” it is the lack of these same qualities that makes a state “small.” 
Assessing the myriad definitions of “small state,” Maass (2009:74-76) referred to this as the 
quantitative approach. Several prominent scholars have advanced such definitions (East 
1973:557; Ólafsson 1998:8-10; Vital 1967:8-9), but quantification’s intuitive appeal is 
undermined by seemingly arbitrary numerical cutoffs. “The weak and powerful states have many 
common characteristics and problems. Any attempt to separate out weak states as a totally 
different ‘breed’ is artificial” (Handel 1981:190). Even when power is treated as resources, small 
states are not helpless, particularly in economic terms. Small states may produce crucial 
commodities, which can serve as an important base of power for even very small states. Strategic 
location can also function as a resource for small states – though perhaps one that cuts both ways 
– as seen in Switzerland’s defensive posture or Singapore’s influence on regional shipping.  
Power and structures, agendas, and interests 
The relationship between power and structures is important in rationalist, critical, and 
constructivist schools of IR. Neorealism, as Wendt (1987:335) noted, defines structure as the 
distribution of capabilities and treats structure as a constraint of states’ choices. In a neorealist 
world, the opportunities for small states would be limited (Ingebritsen 2006:26-29). Following 
Waltz (1979), much work argued that anarchy created a dire situation for small states (Hey 
2003a:6). Employing an essentially realist concept of power, Vital (1967) concluded that, given 
external constraints and threats, small states could rarely be truly independent. International 
structures made it too perilous; passivity or alliance was the likelier – and safer – route. After all, 
if great powers are constantly preoccupied with survival, the threat to small states’ integrity and 
independence must be even graver. From this vantage, different structures of polarity pressure 
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small states in different ways. In a bipolar world, the weight of small states means little to either 
bloc. Incentives to bandwagon will be increased and possibilities to gain influence by shifting 
sides will be reduced. As Rothstein (1968:14-15) argued, different configurations of power 
impact small states’ security and room for maneuver. This view was not unanimously held. 
Keohane (1969) noted that Vital significantly limits what he considers independent foreign 
policy to a near-ideal type of an unaligned small state that acts alone. Where Vital stresses 
systemic forces as constraining, Handel points to small states’ impressive ability to overcome 
their vulnerabilities, adapt to changing conditions, and survive.  
 Critics of realist concepts of structures and power have noted that the effects of power are 
not always visible; power can be reflected in agendas and “non-decisions” (Bachrach and Baratz 
1962), in how weaker actors define their own interests (Lukes 1974), or in structures that shape 
frameworks and guide processes (Strange 1987). Small states’ objectives may be constrained by 
external structures or shaped by hegemonic institutions and “common sense” (Cox 1983; Cox 
1981). These concepts of structural power would seem to limit small states to an even greater 
extent. After all, the powerful create structures and control agendas. Ingebritsen (2000:28) noted, 
“According to structural theorists (Waltz, Keohane, and Wallerstein), the Nordic states should 
have relatively few options given their position in the international system.” If that is the case for 
Nordic and European states, structural theories describe even poorer prospects for small states 
outside the wealthy, Western world. Drawing inspiration from dependency and world systems 
theories, applications of an economic-structural concept of power have often focused on small 
states of the “global south” (Braveboy-Wagner 2003:7-10). The options available to these states 
are structured by their long-term economic and political dependency on great powers (Moon 
1983:333-34). They are doubly marginalized by their peripheral status and their small size 
(Ayoob 2003; Escudé; 1998; Persaud, 2001). Starting in the mid-1980s, studies and conferences 
of the Commonwealth Secretariat increased attention to the economic problems of small island 
states. The Commonwealth (1985) emphasized small-state “Vulnerability” to a host of problems, 
and advanced a concept of resilience, not power, as a solution. Under the framework of “global 
south foreign policy,” Braveboy-Wagner and Snarr (2003:57) argue that due to their position in 
global structures, “these states are for the most part still poor, weak, underdeveloped, 
peripheralized in global institutions, and lack the material power (defined through wealth or the 
means of violence) to bring about systemwide change in their own interests.”  
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The focus on economic structures and their links to power has not been limited to critical 
scholars. Krasner (1976:319) argued that while powerful states determined global economic 
structures, “Trade gives small states relatively more welfare benefits than it gives large states,” 
though with potentially greater impacts on social stability. Katzenstein (1985) concluded that 
some small European states had found successful models for adapting to these challenges. 
Recent work illustrates how many small states have effectively adapted to the U.S.-led economic 
order. Alesina and Spolaore (2003:81) note that globalization has partially offset the 
disadvantages of limited market size and low economies of scale. “Size and prosperity do not 
seem to go hand in hand.” Economic analysis by Easterly and Kray (2000) indicates that small 
states are, on the whole, better off than larger ones (see also Armstrong and Read 1998), 
especially if they are deeply engaged in the global economy. Alesina and Spolaore (2003:197) 
posit that “smaller countries benefit from open trade regimes, so as small countries emerge, it is 
in their interest to press for more open trade regimes.” Small states could gradually shift global 
economic structures to favor their interests. Globalized economies and “safer” international 
environments favor the creation of smaller politics units.  
While often seen as lending themselves to even deeper great-power dominance, the 
second and third faces of power can illuminate nonmaterial exercises of power both directed at 
and led by small states. Following Cox, critical scholars have argued that structures affect both 
interests and agendas, as discussed below, in part through hegemonic ideologies (Berenskoetter 
2007:10-15; Cox 1981, 1983). Deeper structures do not just constrain the decisions of weaker 
states, but shape their identities, interests, and possibilities for action. The approach to structural 
power in Barnett and Duvall (2005:52-55) is somewhat different. While structures shape the 
identity and interests of small states, these are relationships of mutual constitution. Great powers, 
too, are defined by their structural positions. Structures “allocate differential capacities, and 
typically differential advantages, to different positions” and “shape self-understanding and 
subjective interests” (53). The effects of structures are not unidirectional; agents – even relatively 
weak ones – replicate and perhaps alter structures. Great powers are constituted as such in 
relation to small states, and they gain privileges through their favored position. Small states’ 
structural positionality may offer distinctive advantages. Extending Barnett and Duvall’s 
concept, it is important to note that small states’ interests should not be assumed to replicate 
those of great powers. Instead, small states’ interests will be affected by mutually constituted 
8 
 
structures, and thus may be affected by great powers even when there is no discrete, observable 
instance of control. Constructivists have emphasized social and ideational structures of norms 
and culture (Checkel 1998:332-34). Regarding small states, particularly those in the EU, 
constructivists highlight avenues to influence through agendas and discourses (Björkdahl 2008; 
Jakobsen 2009; Kronsell, 2002). These could either be direct, falling into Barnett and Duvall’s 
structural power, or diffuse, which they label “productive power.” In their words, both forms of 
power “concern how the social capacities of actors are socially produced, and how these 
processes shape actors’ self-understandings and perceived interests” (Barnett and Duvall 
2005:55).  
Recent work on small states offers examples of both. Jourde (2007:482) shows how 
“weak African authoritarian states draw on and change the representations that Western powers 
hold about them,” using these interpretations to further their own domestic and international 
interests. In essence, they redefine their constitutive relationships with more powerful states in a 
process Jourde refers to as “framing” and “extraversion.” At times, these ideational foreign 
policy strategies are more diffuse and mediated through institutions. Examining disputes between 
small states and international organizations over tax policy, Vlek (2009) illustrates how the 
OECD and Caribbean states rhetorically jousted over “tax havens.” Bailer (2004) has argued that 
states use both positioning and proximity to agenda-setters to advance their preferred positions in 
EU negotiations. Darnton (2012:64-66) argues that Latin American states may influence the 
agenda while the United States focuses elsewhere; when U.S. attention returns, Latin American 
leaders advance preferred interpretations and solutions. While structures and agendas may 
constrain the small, these non-material aspects of power also present new possibilities.  
Power through interdependence and institutions 
Discussions about power and small states have drawn inspiration from liberal IR theory 
regarding interdependence and institutions. Interdependence de-emphasizes military force and 
illustrates the complexity involved in the exercise of power. Keohane and Nye (1973:160-61) 
stressed that power “cannot be considered a homogenous, highly interchangeable commodity.” A 
liberal, relational approach makes it clear that power – both the ability to change others’ 
behaviors and to resist pressures to change one’s own – can vary dramatically across issue areas 
(Keohane and Nye 1977:91-98). This view of power has been influential in studies of small 
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states. Baldwin (1979:164) wrote: “So-called ‘weak powers’ influence so-called ‘strong powers’ 
because of the power analyst’s failure to account for the possibility that a country may be weak 
in one situation but strong in another.” Complex interdependence increases the influence and 
maneuverability of small states. In oceans and fishing issues, small states gained important 
influence through international organizations, law, bargaining linkages, and even symbolic uses 
of force (Keohane and Nye 1977:112-28). By de-emphasizing the military aspects of power, 
Nye’s (2004) more recent concept of soft power  opens the door for states to achieve their goals 
without capabilities for force or coercion. Though Nye has focused largely on the United States, 
small-state scholars have adopted and modified Nye’s concept. Chong (2010) argues that the tiny 
Vatican and small but robust Singapore use soft power to overcome smallness through “virtual 
enlargement.” Soft power strategies offer another option for states lacking traditional power 
resources. 
As noted above, a variety of evidence demonstrates that small states can be economically 
successful in an interdependent world. A key argument for Alesina and Spolaore (2003:81-94, 
155-174) is that an open trading system allows small states to emerge as viable and successful 
economic entities. Though they are likely to be asymmetrically dependent on liberalized access 
to larger states’ markets, this has not always allowed large states to bully small ones. Handel 
(1981:236-256) notes that small states have frequently resisted economic pressures from great 
powers by shifting their trade patterns. Small, developed states have shown resilience to 
structural, global market forces and have found niches in the global economy (Katzenstein 
1985:21-30). If trade allows some small states to thrive, does interdependence also create 
avenues for influence? Keohane and Nye (1977:202-204) noted Canada’s success in using its 
complex interdependent relationship with the United States to advance its goals vis-à-vis its 
powerful neighbor. Great powers, too, may depend on small states to accomplish their 
objectives, purchase their products, or supply materials. Secondly, scholars have built on liberal 
IR theory to examine how small states use institutions to enhance security and pursue interests.  
“International organizations are frequently congenial institutions for weak states,” which can use 
them to build solidarity and coalitions, advance favorable norms, and “pursue linkage strategies” 
(Keohane and Nye 1977:36). Barnett and Duvall (2005:51) define institutional power as “actors’ 
control of others in indirect ways” such as by forming rules and procedures. While large states 
have often led efforts to create institutions in world politics, small states frequently turn to 
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international law and institutions both as focal points for cooperative efforts and as a means to 
limit the unilateralism of great powers. As such, institutions can be understood both as a site for 
the exercise of power, as in much of the literature on small states in the EU, and as a means for 
both power-over and power-with.  
 Goetschel (1998) asked, if small states were no longer forced to concentrate on their 
survival, how would they act? How would they affect, and be affected by, processes of 
integration? These questions have been central in Europe, where many scholars argue that small 
countries have been able to “punch above their weight” because of institutional arrangements 
that grant them a greater degree of influence and voice. Luxembourg has been a founding, model 
member of European institutions, and it has used this to pressure for favorable EU policies, while 
seeking to strengthen institutions as a bulwark against historic German-French rivalry (Hey 
2003b). Ingebritsen (2002:383) argues that small European states opted to pool sovereignty in 
European institutions both in the quest for regional prosperity and to enhance European influence 
vis-à-vis the United States. Small states have “a greater capacity to influence the agenda in world 
politics and play a critical role in the evolution of European integration than is commonly 
understood” (Ingebritsen 2004:369-70). Inside European institutions, small states can construct 
“a position of authority” through diplomacy and administrative excellence. Panke (2011:135-37) 
argues that despite disadvantages, small states are often effective participants in EU negotiations, 
prioritizing among and within institutions to gain an impact where it matters most. Small states 
have pressed to maintain and create favorable rules and voting procedures inside the EU, such as 
a presidency that grants small states relatively significant influence (Thorhallsson and Wivel 
2006:660-64). There is evidence that “The commission’s positions tend to favor small and 
medium member states slightly more than large member states” (Thomson 2008:190). In 
European security, Rickli (2008:310-11) argues that small states must choose between autonomy 
and influence through alliance, but cannot have both. Certainly many have opted for 
engagement. Baltic states have used membership in NATO to advance security priorities, even 
before the recent crises with Russia (Hamilton 2008). Institutional designs have important effects 
on small states, and not surprisingly, these have often pushed for equal voting rights and greater 
input, a course prevalent in Europe (Ólafsson 1998; Panke 2010; Wivel 2010), but also present 
elsewhere. However, Rickli’s dichotomy overlooks structural and productive aspects of power, 
and therefore seems to collapse collective and derivative power, as discussed below. Small states 
11 
 
may seek and use influence precisely to restrain other states and enhance their autonomy. Non-
European small states sometimes construct and maintain institutions and inter-governmental 
organizations (IGOs) for these benefits. Singapore plays a central role in the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and other regional forums (Acharya 2008:23-29). Qatar has 
enhanced its international visibility through the Gulf Cooperation Council (Kamrava 2013). 
Latin American states have appealed to international law to limit or delegitimize U.S. 
interventions (Friedman and Long 2015), while also creating a host of regional and subregional 
organizations. A coalition of small and medium states from across the globe pushed for the 
creation of the International Criminal Court, even over objections from large states. The court’s 
statutes give them weight disproportionate to their populations (Bosco 2014:8, 31-40). As 
Keohane and Nye indicated four decades ago, international institutions can give small states both 
a forum and a tool for advancing their interests. As Barnett and Duvall note, this often takes a 
diffuse form; small states seek to influence institutional norms and processes in ways that grant 
them greater influence. 
Power through norms 
The concept of power as related to norms, discourses, and ideas is most closely linked 
with constructivist IR theory. Ropp and Sikkink (1999:9) discuss the “power of principles;” 
norms, they argue, can change both interests and incentives. This has been referred to as 
“normative power” to affect state behavior (Klotz, 1995). More broadly, Manners (2002:32) 
argued for normative power as “the ability to shape or change what passes for normal in 
international relations.” Because the ability to promote ideas has no necessary relation to state 
size – after all, the constructivist literature focuses on individuals, NGOs, and IGOs as “norm 
entrepreneurs” – this form of power has drawn great attention in relation to small states. Perhaps 
its foremost proponent, Ingebritsen (2002), has highlighted the outsize roles attained by small 
states, especially in Scandinavia, through the promotion of norms on conflict resolution and 
environmental protection. Small states have been active mediators and peacekeepers, building 
norms that delegitimize the use of force (Waage 2007, Kleiboer 1996). While attention to 
normative power has grown, it is not entirely absent in earlier work on small states. Fox’s (1959: 
2-3) classic book notes that:  
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the ability of a state to secure what it wants through the use of violence is only 
one mark of political power...small states may have at their command the capacity 
to appeal to world opinion, operating from a “rectitude” base. 
More recently, small states have acted as norm entrepreneurs in various areas. Small and middle 
powers were instrumental in advancing “norms without great powers” to support multilateral 
treaties including a ban on antipersonnel land mines (Bower 2015). Small island states have used 
their particular vulnerability to advance normative claims surrounding climate change (Benwell 
2011). Sikkink (2007) has argued that small and middle powers in Latin America played 
influential roles in advancing specific conceptions of human rights, including economic and 
social rights in the immediate post-war period, even as great powers were opposed or 
ambivalent. For the most part, advancing norms is a long-term proposition for smaller states. 
That is, through changing international norms, smaller states do not seek to affect one particular 
outcome – a usage somewhat distinct from Klotz’s original term. Instead, they seek to reshape 
the international environment in ways that favor behaviors that are more beneficial to them. 
Norms against unilateral intervention represent a significant victory for smaller states. Broadly 
oriented efforts to shift international norms fit within Barnett and Duvall’s “productive power,” 
by seeking to reconstitute diffuse aspects of international social relations (2005:55-57).  
Bases and Means of Small States’ Power 
The concept of “small state” has long been defined according to a particular conception 
of power –power as possession of particular, material resources. However, in a world where the 
anxiety about survival has decreased and where military coercion no longer clearly dominates 
the hierarchy of power, the conceptualization of both power and the small state are open to 
reinterpretation. Other ways of understanding power open analysts’ eyes to the possibility of 
greater influence from states long termed “small.” 
Dahl’s work on power is most often remembered for his classic formulation: “A has 
power over B to the extent he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do” (Dahl, 
1957:202-03). In the same piece, Dahl adds that what is more interesting than specifying the 
actors in a power relationship (that A has power over B) is to analyze the base, means, amount, 
and scope of one actor’s power over another. The following taxonomy uses that framework to 
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assess the ways in which small states – lacking the traditional bases of power – specialize in 
other bases and means of power. According to Dahl, “The base of an actor’s power consists of 
all the resources – opportunities, acts, objects, etc.  – that he can exploit to effect the behavior of 
another.” The means involve how an actor utilizes its base, such as through threats and promises. 
“Thus the means is a mediating activity by A between A’s base and B’s response.” The scope 
involves the range of B’s responses that A can influence. The amount of power for Dahl is 
probabilistic – what are the chances that A’s actions will change B’s behavior (within a given 
scope)? Dahl (1957:203-06) also suggests that analysts should consider the number and type of 
actors who will respond to A’s power. When analyzing small states, the framework is useful in 
moving the analyst away from the dominant focus on a handful of resources as the “base” of 
state power. A small state might have different sources of power, differently exercised, to 
varying degrees, across a range of issues. While not exclusive to small states, these alternate 
forms of power are likely to receive greater emphasis from those lacking traditional bases of 
power, perhaps leading to a greater specialization in their use.  
Though Dahl’s definition of power has often served as a basis for realists, it does not 
inherently favor one type of actor (say, great powers) over others. His approach is amenable to 
studying small states because what matters is less resources possessed than the effects of power. 
Bases and means do not “provide us with a comparison of the power of two or more actors, 
except insofar as it permits us to make inferences” about B’s responses (1957:206). Dahl’s 
formulation is normally seen as being limited to compulsory power – a direct interaction between 
specific actors – and that is where Barnett and Duvall place it. Compulsory power is the facet of 
power most obviously relevant to observing how states, large or small, exercise international 
influence, particularly via the use of material resources (or bases) most commonly identified with 
international power. This form of power is thought to translate, at least to some extent, across 
issue areas, allowing great powers to create linkages and compel and/or incentivize changed 
behaviors from smaller states. IR’s focus on compulsory power has fed into the conventional 
wisdom that while small states may exercise a degree of influence that seems to exceed their 
size, when confronted with a great power, they are “ultimately featherweights without a chance 
to truly beat a heavyweight.”3 However, compulsory power is not necessarily limited to great 
                                                          
3
 This phrase was suggested by an anonymous reviewer. 
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powers, nor are the sources of compulsory power limited to the material (Barnett and Duvall 
2005:50). Power is more complex than compulsion for states of all sizes. A broader 
interpretation of power that is more attuned to its structural, institutional, and productive aspects, 
suggests additional opportunities for small states. Small states, too, can produce institutions and 
discourses; their actions can (re)constitute structures.  
The following section argues that small states can most successfully pursue their interests 
through three types of power: derivative power, particular-intrinsic power, and collective power. 
These categories evaluate small-state “strength in relation to their specific interests and needs” 
(Handel 1981:257). Though these types of power are not foreclosed to middle or great powers, 
small states are forced by their limitations to rely on them to a greater extent, developing specific 
bases and means to be successful. Different small states will possess different material, 
ideational, and relational bases; they will also have different goals. These discrepancies lead to 
significant diversity in the means of small states’ power, as well as its effectiveness in changing 
others’ behavior (as seen in the amount and scope, in Dahl’s words). 
Particular-Intrinsic, Derivative, and Collective Power 
Each of the three categories described here can be seen as having a different base, which in turn 
lends itself to different means. As in any relational conception of power, these two aspects can be 
understood as properties of small state (A) and its actions. Understanding the amount and scope 
of power requires the analyst to consider the object of action (B), and to place the exercise of 
power in a specific context. Because small states – or at least the smaller state in a dyadic sense – 
have relatively scarce international coercive capabilities, they develop particular-intrinsic, 
derivative, and collective power. These types of power match the bases available to the small 
state to its goals through the application of certain means. As post-Dahlian approaches to power 
indicate, these means may be directed at a specific actor(s) or their exercise may be diffuse. 
Particular-intrinsic Power 
Power in International Relations, when discussed in terms of capabilities or “potential 
power,” (Copeland 2000:6) is usually synonymous with intrinsic power. Morgenthau’s criteria of 
power were largely intrinsic. Population, territory, GDP, and military strength are all inherent. 
While there is no agreed upon weighting of these criteria, states are usually understood as great 
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powers, middle powers, or small states based on estimates of these factors. Though small states 
lack many of the normal categories of capabilities, they may possess particular forms of intrinsic 
power. Particular-intrinsic resources are a potential base of power, but these resources (less so 
than a tremendous military) only become salient in world politics through their exercise. Not 
commonly understood as power, the resource fades from view until it is given means and applied 
to a specific goal, or scope. The amount of power – defined by Dahl as probability of changed 
behavior – depends heavily on the context in which particular-intrinsic power is deployed. 
Examples, even if anecdotal, help illustrate how this form of power matters for small 
states. Hydrocarbon resources have been the most prominent. On their own, these resources 
constitute a base of power (and a rather traditional one). Hydrocarbons are not salient, ipso facto, 
as a way for the possessor (A) to make a targeted state (B) do something that B would not 
otherwise do. In fact, for the early history of oil production, the British and American exploiters 
of hydrocarbon resources derived more power from them than the Middle Eastern states that sat 
atop the oil and gas. These same resources can make states prone to division and strife instead of 
making them powerful. Internationally, hydrocarbons gain potency through the means employed 
to deploy the base. Initially, the scope of these actions was narrow – pressuring for greater 
control and higher prices for those resources. As the context changed, oil states were able to 
broaden the scope and increase the amount of power they could derive from this resource. The 
scope of small states’ particular-intrinsic power will often start narrowly, but some states may be 
able to astutely build linkages to pursue broader foreign policy objectives. The combination of 
base with means provided new power to a number of small states – making formerly marginal 
states central to world politics. All but three of OPEC’s twelve active members have populations 
under thirty million, but in the current context, resource control gives them greater influence 
singly and together (more on that shortly). Outside of OPEC, Braveboy-Wagner (2010) discusses 
how very small Trinidad and Tobago is able to deploy its reserves of natural gas to gain 
influence and pursue its goals in the Caribbean.  
Particular-intrinsic power is not limited to oil and gas producers. Panama’s control over 
its isthmian canal lets it play a larger role than its Central American neighbors in a host of issues 
related to global commerce. Even with the Canal under U.S. control, Panama was able to use its 
territoriality to effect major changes in U.S. policy – though doing so took nearly a decade (Long 
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2014). Military power, long the sine qua non of international power, is not the exclusive preserve 
of great powers, either. Countries as different as Switzerland and Singapore have invested in 
outsize forces that can deny larger neighbors access and influence; both states have unique 
geographical locations that have encouraged this strategy (Acharya 2008:14-17; Fox 1959:5-6). 
Though great powers may have once preferred to directly control strategic locations (like 
Singapore), they have largely opted for lower-cost strategies (Desch 1993:12). After 2001, this 
allowed Central Asian states to play great power rivalries for greater benefits, including military 
and economic assistance, that bolstered domestic control and boosted international influence 
(Cooley 2014:20-21). Small states that possess these strategic locations therefore hold a base of 
particular-intrinsic power.  
As with great powers that use their intrinsic resources via a sticks-and-carrots approach, 
compulsory power is the most immediately visible aspect of particular-intrinsic power. It can 
both be broader and complementary to other forms of power. Particular-intrinsic power can grant 
a state a central position in an international organization, allowing it to shape rules (institutional 
power). It may also shape the constitution of a relationship between a small state and a great 
power (structural power). Particular-intrinsic power can combine material and ideational 
resources. Identity can serve as a base for the exercise of power. Following constructivist 
insights, identity is mutually constituted, and therefore is not under the total control of the actor 
with that identity. This lends identities a degree of stability; while they are malleable, they are 
not easily or unilaterally altered (Hopf, 1998:174-77). However, the words and actions of a small 
state – its performances – along with the perceptions of others, help construct that small state’s 
identity and shape its relations with other states (Jourde 2007). Given this ideational base, it can 
take actions (means) that will be at least partially interpreted in light of that identity. For 
example, Scandinavian countries have gained fame as promoters of international norms on 
mediation of conflicts and sustainable development (Ingebritsen 2002:11-23). This identity 
emerges from intersubjective understandings of these countries’ domestic societies and foreign 
policies. It has allowed these states to emerge as models for the resolution of conflicts (Jakobsen 
2007). Finland has developed an identity not as small but as smart and innovative (Browning 
2006). These particular-intrinsic resources are based in identity, but states may deploy them 
through various means in exercises of direct or diffuse power. Qatar, building on the wealth 
derived from its natural gas, developed an identity as a hub for globalization, as the center of 
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communications, air travel, and financial networks. While the material bases of power are 
important, the changed perception of Qatar has allowed it to play an outsize role in regional 
conflicts and global economics (Kamrava 2013:61-68). Cuba, since 1959 a hyperactive small-
state par excellence, has developed a number of notable and unconventional bases of particular-
intrinsic power. These include world-class medical capabilities, particularly in vaccine research 
and the treatment of tropical disease (Jiménez 2011, 2013), and widely admired sports and 
sports-training programs (Huish 2011; Kirk 2009). Cuba has been able to employ these bases to 
work toward foreign policy goals that range from gaining subsidized energy concessions to 
advancing counterhegemonic South-South cooperation through both institutions and diffuse 
norms. During the Cold War, it also developed conventional capabilities – though these were 
unconventional for a state its size – deploying covert and overt military power “to make a world 
safe for revolution,” (Dominguez 1989). Cuba’s great-power-sized foreign policies drew on 
Soviet support, but essentially reflected Cuba’s own goals and particular-intrinsic power 
(Gleijeses 2008). 
Derivative Power 
Lacking significant material capabilities of their own, small states may derive power by 
convincing larger states to take actions that boost their interests. This has often been seen as the 
primary option for small states, described by Keohane (1971) as “the big influence of small 
allies.” The United States’ open, pluralistic foreign policy decision-making process allowed 
small state leaders to appeal to U.S. missionary zeal or court narrow bureaucratic interests. Small 
states’ derivative power is not limited to relations with the United States. Fox (1959:45) wrote 
that, “The strength of the small states was thus ‘other-conditioned’ and therefore inherently 
unstable, depending as it did upon the existing relationships between the great powers.” Handel 
(1981:257), who employed the term “derivative,” considered this the most important facet of 
small states’ strength. “The diplomatic art of the weak states is to obtain, commit, and 
manipulate, as far as possible, the power of other more powerful states in their own interests.” 
Through the use of derivative power, the leaders of small states seek to act as the proverbial tail 
that wags the dog. However, it is not an unalloyed strength. Scholars and statesmen starting with 
Machiavelli have warned small-state leaders against allying with a great power: “an unequal 
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alliance provides the small power with only a limited potential for achieving goals. It has little 
leverage to exert against its stronger ally” (Rothstein 1968:122). 
Derivative power poses a conceptual challenge for orthodox approaches to power. At first 
glance, it does not seem to have any base at all. However, following Barnett and Duvall, the base 
of derivative power can be understood as the constitutive relationship between small ally and 
great power. If one accepts that power is about social relations, those relations may also form a 
source of power. The means of derivative power will vary according to the small state’s goals 
and its relationship with the great power. In a particularly friendly relationship, smaller powers 
might gain access to policy discussions. Risse-Kappen (1995:198-206) argues that in some cases, 
NATO countries were seen by the United States almost as additional bureaucratic actors with 
substantial input in debates. Keohane (1971:165-166) describes small states like Portugal 
leveraging their influence over the branches of the U.S. military to achieve broader policy 
objectives or to extract resources. In a pluralistic system, small states might be able to launch 
campaigns to influence policy through co-ethnic or ideological supporters, including through 
legislative lobbying (DeConde 1992; Mearsheimer and Walt 2007; Newhouse 2009). In more 
contested relationships – depending on the international context – small states have engaged in 
“patron alliance manipulation,” by threatening to defect (Carney 1989; Jourde 2007:484). This 
could be done in order to draw funding or military equipment, or to gain support against 
domestic or regional rivals. Carney (1989) treats these as patron-client relationships in which the 
smaller state is rewarded for compliance. Lake (2009:45-62) makes a similar characterization of 
what he terms “hierarchical” relationships; commands from the large state are recognized as 
legitimate by the small state, even if these relationships are often contested. However, when a 
“client” can help a patron achieve a significant goal, the small state can exact a significant price 
(Shoemaker and Spanier 1984:17-18). Fox (1959) argued that small states played alliances in 
order to stay on the margins of World War II. This type of derivative power is rooted in 
structural, not compulsory, aspects. Small states may reconstitute a relationship in ways that 
make their cooperation (submission in Lake’s terms; compliance in Carney’s) valuable through 
ideological, strategic, or material means. Clients – not just the patron – define the relationship. 
Derivative power is likely to have a narrow scope. It is impractical for a small state to try 
to change the overall disposition of a great power. However, it may be possible to change the 
19 
 
great power’s policy on a specific matter of interest to a small power. As scholars of 
interdependence, starting with Keohane and Nye (1977) have argued, given that questions of 
central and intense interest for a small state might be peripheral to a great power with global 
concerns, these seemingly minor changes of policy can be overwhelmingly important for a small 
demandeur. Put differently, asymmetries in material power may be somewhat offset by 
asymmetries in interest intensity and expertise that favor the smaller state. A small change in 
U.S. economic or military assistance could amount to a significant portion of the state budget for 
a small, low-income state, and might tilt the balance between domestic or regional rivals. As 
Keohane (1969:310) concluded, “If Lilliputians can tie up Gulliver, or make him do their 
fighting for them, they must be studied as carefully as the giant.” 
The advantage of derivative power is that it offers the possibility of amplifying a small 
state’s influence through the prism of a great power – though with a concomitant decline in 
control over outcomes. In Dahl’s framework, derivative power can offer small states a much 
greater amount of power over a third party, and perhaps at a lower cost. In practice, empirically 
establishing derivative power requires a scholar to address the implicit counterfactual that, absent 
the influence of the small state, the great power would not have taken the course of action that it 
chose. Asserting the amount of power that owes to a given small state is harder still and is likely 
to require careful process-tracing. Only a handful of studies have attempted to address the 
question directly. Colombia has used its relationship with the United States to gain the upper 
hand in its internal conflict, and at times to strengthen its position vis-à-vis neighboring 
Venezuela. One scholar termed the U.S.-Colombian relationship “intervention by invitation” 
(Tickner 2007). Small powers have long tried to protect their safety or gain regional advantages 
through effective use of alliances (Rothstein 1968). U.S. support has been crucial to Taiwan’s 
continued independence and for Israel’s military and economic strength. While larger states also 
try to accomplish their objectives through third parties, derivative power is an essential approach 
for the small state. Based on relationships with a larger state, this form of power offers the 
opportunity for a small state to pursue and perhaps accomplish major objectives that could 
otherwise be beyond its grasp. 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
20 
 
Table 1: Three Categories of Power 
 Particular-intrinsic Derivative  Collective 
Base (source) Resource inherent to 
small state 
Relationship with 
great power 
Relationships with 
smaller powers 
Means 
(instrument) 
Threat/promise to 
withhold or grant 
Lobbying, framing, 
patron alliance 
manipulation 
Institutional; ad hoc 
coalitions 
Amount 
(extent) 
Contextually 
dependent 
Potentially great Depends on coalition 
Scope (range) Directly related to 
resource, plus 
linkages 
Issue specific Narrow for ad hoc 
coalitions; diffuse for 
institutions  
 
Collective Power 
If the fundamental base of derivative power is the relationship between the small state 
and a great power, the fundamental base of collective power is the relationship between a small 
state and associated non-great powers. It is not surprising that small states might seek strength in 
numbers, but it has generally been assumed that for these groups to gain significance, they would 
have to be “so large that each state has minimal influence” (Keohane 1969:296). Rothstein 
(1968:170-178) notes the limited successes of the Little Entente, but is ultimately skeptical of 
small power alliances, at least in a military sense. However, small states’ collective power can 
work in different ways: through dedicated institutionalism, via single-issue groupings, or to 
leverage allies for one state’s cause. In Barnett and Duvall’s taxonomy, collective power could 
be either compulsory or institutional. It is compulsory in cases when a grouping of small states 
directly pressures a larger state to change its policies through threats or promises. More 
frequently, this will be mediated by institutions that may give some formal protection and voice 
to small states. Institutions improve small states’ ability to influence both primary rules and 
secondary rules about the processes through which decisions are made. Where institutions are 
used as a venue for promoting and expanding norms that affect international society more 
broadly – and are therefore not limited to the interactions of specific actors, collective power can 
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also be “productive” in Barnett and Duvall’s sense. IGOs often facilitate norm entrepreneurship 
and diffusion. Looking at Sweden,  Björkdahl (2007:541) argues, “Small states in particular rely 
on international organizations and multilateral settings for their norm promoting activities.” 
For this reason, small states have been enthusiastic joiners and builders of institutions. 
“Small states try to minimize the costs of conducting foreign policy by initiating more joint 
action and targeting multi-actor fora” (Neumann and Gstöhl 2006:12). IGOs provide a seat at the 
table, and in many cases, they also provide a vote, which might be formally equal to the vote of a 
great power. Panke (2012) demonstrates that small states are able to deploy that vote, along with 
dedicated expertise in the institutions that matter most to them, to gain greater influence in 
international negotiations. Small states commit to play by the rules (and subtly shape them) 
because they believe the institution is likely to advance their national interests. There are 
numerous examples where small states play outsize roles within global, regional, and issue-
specific IGOs. Citizens of small states often serve as influential heads of IGOs like the United 
Nations. Small states have often been large contributors of foreign aid and participants in 
peacekeeping missions, where Nordic states have exercised significant influence on doctrines 
(Jakobsen 2007). Estonia has made a point of meeting NATO guidelines for military spending, 
even as most European members fell well short of their targets. Itself a victim of major 
cyberattacks, Estonia hosts the NATO center on cybersecurity. Inside the EU, it has worked to 
block policies that it fears would enhance energy dependency on Russia (Crandall 2014; 
Hamilton 2008:119). Small states have been enthusiastic supporters of the European Union; in 
several of its decision-making bodies, they have formally equal representation. By actively 
engaging with EU Commissioners, small states in Europe have at times sought to use the 
Commission bureaucracy as a mediator or advocate with the larger powers (Thorhallsson 2000). 
By demonstrating their own willingness to play by institutional rules, small members like 
Luxembourg can credibly condemn larger states for hypocrisy and double standards (Hey 
2003b). The combination of rules and negotiating strategies can help small states minimize the 
effects of asymmetry. For example, Antigua and Barbuda won its case against the United States 
at every level of the World Trade Organization. As one scholar (Jackson 2012:382) notes, 
“When a very small state such as Antigua employs thoughtful strategies and follows the 
procedures laid out by the institution, it can gain bargaining leverage.” 
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Global organizations facilitate access to a broad audience including larger powers. 
However, they might provide less freedom of action for smaller states, which in response have 
built regional organizations to serve as forums for policy coordination and as joint mechanisms 
to press their agendas. Given its European focus, the literature on small states often points to 
small-state led organizations in Northern Europe that facilitate Scandinavian and Nordic 
cooperation (Ingebritsen 2002; Jakobsen 2007). The Finnish Northern Dimension Initiative 
promoted national interests in the guise of pan-European interests (Arter 2000). Though the Gulf 
Cooperation Council was long seen as a tool for Saudi Arabia to corral its small neighbors, Qatar 
and the United Arab Emirates have more recently achieved strong positions within the forum 
(Kamrava 2013:32-40). Small states, notably Singapore, have been major players in ASEAN. 
Small states have also created their own groupings focused on gaining world attention or 
changing policies on issues of specific importance. Initially, much of small states’ diplomatic 
attention in this vein was economic. The Caribbean Community brought together very small 
economies with the goal of increasing resilience to global economic fluctuations (Braveboy-
Wagner 2008). Small states were strong advocates for the notion of commodity producer 
associations under a New International Economic Order in the 1970s (Rothstein 1979; White 
1975). More recently, given their unique vulnerability, small island states have coalesced around 
the threat of climate change in order to organize a project of global scope, with deep economic 
ramifications for established and emerging powers. Their success has been partial. They 
achieved a special status for “small island developing states,” and have used “theatrical 
interventions” and “grandstand tactics” to shame the United States into a change of position. “It 
is the vulnerability of small states that sets them apart from political wrangling and gives them a 
natural leadership role” (Benwell 2011:207). They rely on collective power to amass votes and 
give greater resonance to arguments centered on survival and morality. Finally, small states have 
been able to gain the diplomatic support of other small states to advance their own particular 
causes internationally. In this case, the supportive countries do not necessarily have a direct 
benefit for their support, though they might hope for reciprocal support or indirect benefits. In 
the 1970s, Panama gained the support of numerous small and medium states in support of its 
position on control of the Panama Canal (Long 2014, 2015). Near-unanimous Latin American 
diplomatic pressure and a threatened boycott of the Summit of the Americas added pressure on 
the United States to alter its policies on Cuba. 
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To return to Dahl’s framework, collective power’s base is a small state’s relationships 
with other states. This differs from derivative power both in terms of the partner and because 
collective-power partners are not singly able to assist the state in achieving its objectives. Inside 
institutions, rules that mediate relations between states could serve as a base of power. For 
example, voting rights give small states at least a modicum of power in situations where their 
vote could tip the balance or is needed for a coalition. If unanimity is required or strongly 
preferred by an organization, a vote can allow a small state the power to stop or modify 
initiatives favored by great powers. This form of power is not unique to small states; clearly, the 
Security Council veto is a base of power for the permanent five. With social relations, including 
rules, forming the base of collective power, the means concern the application of those relations. 
The individual small state gains power by acting through the organization or institution, and by 
positing its own goals as in the institutional interest. Small states might be more able to 
accomplish this sleight of hand than great powers, either because they can be seen as useful 
intermediaries between great powers or because their size means that concessions to them are 
minor from a great-power point of view. In practice, states exercising collective power will 
deploy a number of means. Important among these are agenda-setting, the definition of mutual 
interests, and persuasion.  
As with other forms of power, scope and amount are heavily dependent on context. The 
scope of collective power, understood as the range of behavior that could be changed by the 
small power, is potentially great. If small states can influence institutional rules and procedures, 
then the effects of these rules can be “sticky” and perhaps unforeseen (Ikenberry 1998), just as 
for rules shaped by greater powers. Ad hoc coalitions of small states will typically have a 
narrower scope due to the difficulty of building and maintaining a consensus between disparate 
states. Holding a group together on one issue is more feasible than across a broad agenda. The 
amount of collective power – the delta in the probability of changed behavior – is likely to be 
low when dealing with a great power. When fundamental interests are at play, in the near term, a 
great power is likely to override a coalition of small states. However, these coalitions can 
exercise meaningful influence in other ways. First, they may nudge other states toward the 
desired position of the small state, even where they cannot force a reversal. Secondly, when other 
states’ interests are diffuse or poorly defined, they can play a significant role in affecting agendas 
and influencing definitions of interests. Finally, coalitions of small states can signal limitations 
24 
 
or vetoes on larger states’ actions. In this case the sheer number of small states can give them a 
legitimacy that outstrips their share of world population. This is notable in what many perceive 
as the global legitimacy of the International Criminal Court, though nearly two-thirds of the 
world’s population resides in non-member states (Deitelhoff and Wallbott 2012:350-55).  
Conclusions 
In many respects, today’s world is a more hospitable place for small states. Their survival 
and territorial integrity are rarely threatened; many thrive economically. Has comity translated 
into influence? This article argues that the implied focus on resource-based and compulsory 
power has limited IR scholars’ ability to assess small states’ power. Small states may specialize 
in less conventional bases and means, drawing on institutional, structural, and productive facets 
of power, as well as nontraditional forms of compulsory power. This article has sought to 
develop that approach to connect work on small states to broader debates about power in IR. 
Incorporating other analyses of power, especially Barnett and Duvall’s taxonomy, with Dahl’s 
classic framework, the article proposes three ways in which small states exercise power – 
through particular-intrinsic power, derivative power, and collective power. These forms of power 
are not exclusive to states under some threshold of material capabilities. In fact, these types of 
power are perhaps more important for all states today; military force is less acceptable and 
salient, interdependence is greater, and norms and institutions are more important. However, the 
weaker the state in terms of traditionally salient military and economic resources, the more it 
must specialize in and develop these diverse approaches to power. Small states’ power might 
look a bit different, but on a fundamental level it remains power. 
Rich and poor small states – or for that matter, territorially small and expansive, but low-
population states – differ in ways that complicate strict comparison. However, these states’ 
attempts to exert influence share important similarities at a higher level of abstraction. To 
overcome their relative deficits in material resources, these states turn to particular-intrinsic, 
derivative, or collective forms of power. Though not unique to small states, specializing in 
particular material and ideational resources can increase a small state’s power. These states must 
also emphasize power based on relationships in order to leverage the power of larger allies and to 
enhance their position and influence in international society through coalitions and institutions. 
Two of these three forms indicate that small states are less likely to pursue their aims 
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individually. This suggests that while small states themselves are not necessarily comparable, 
there might be good reasons to compare their actions and relationships. Further work on small 
states’ power might usefully turn to the challenge of contextualization: when are small states 
most likely to turn to a certain type of power? Returning to the bases and means of small-state 
power, along with the scope and amount of its effects, is one promising approach. 
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